

GLOBAL SITUATION OF MIGRATION AND REFUGE

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Abstract

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) warns that in 2020 we have reached the dramatic figure of 79.5 million forcibly displaced people in the world. The migration issue is currently one of the most worrying in terms of Human Rights. Over the past few years there has been an increase in armed conflicts in North Africa, especially bloody conflicts in Libya, Syria and where the Islamic State has intervened. These conflicts have put thousands of people in unsustainable living conditions in their countries of origin, so many of them have chosen to flee to Europe to protect their lives and that of their families. The International Society, and especially the European Union, in the middle of an economic and identity crisis, has been overwhelmed and has not managed to articulate a global strategy in order to resolve the delicate situation we are experiencing. At the global level, the United Nations has also tried to create a solution for managing migratory flows based on coordination and joint responsibility. However, it has only been able to approve a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration that is not obligatory, but voluntary. This research makes a descriptive and functional analysis of the legislation and public policies developed within the field of migration and refuge, with special attention to what refers to cooperation, integration and management of cultural diversity and development.

Keywords

Migrations, Refugees, Human Rights, Global Compact for Migration, Multilateralism.

Summary

1. Contextualization. 2. Humanitarian refugee crisis in the Mediterranean sea. 3. Public integration policies. 4. Global compact for migration. 5. The migratory issue in civil society. 6. Conclusions.

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1. CONTEXTUALIZATION.

According to UNHCR data, in 2020 we have reached the figure of 79.5 million forcibly displaced people in the world. Of these, 45.7 are internally displaced, that is, they have had to leave their place of residence to move to another site within their own country. 26 million are refugees, that is, people who have been forced to leave their country because of danger to their integrity. This is especially alarming if we take into account that in 2018 the number of displaced people was 68.5 million. In other words, the number has increased by 11 million people. It should be clarified that most of the displaced come from countries in conflict, such as Libya and Syria in North Africa or Venezuela in recent years in America. In fact, 68% come from just 5 countries: Syria (6.6 million), Venezuela (3.7 million), Afghanistan (2.7 million), South Sudan (2.2 million) and Myanmar (1.1 million). It is also necessary to clarify that, contrary to what is believed, around 85% of the displaced people in the world are hosted in developing countries.

In recent years, as a consequence of the armed conflicts in North Africa, there has been an exponential growth in forced migrations to Europe. The conflicts in Libya, Afghanistan and, especially, Syria, have generated an unprecedented volume of refugees who are trying to save their lives and that of their families and whose escape route is mainly Europe.

The routes of immigration to Europe are complex, highly diversified and changing. The most voluminous are produced by sea from Egypt, Libya and Turkey to the coasts of Italy and Greece and also by land from Turkey to Bulgaria, trying to continue from there to the north of the EU, passing through Romania or Serbia. All the aforementioned routes are full of dangers, as is known, and the countries of transit and destination have been progressively imposing obstacles and obstacles to entry into their territory. All of this makes the situation even more difficult than it already is for many civilians, who find themselves without any alternative to provide themselves and their families with a safe place.

On April 18, 2015, a large boat with almost a thousand people sinks off the coast of Libya. Its members were people from Egypt and Libya who were fleeing the Libyan war in the direction of the Italian island of Lampedusa. More than 800 people died in that shipwreck. European public opinion was shocked by the event and the Heads of State and Government met five days later, on April 23, 2015, in Brussels. Since then, there have been numerous summits, meetings and high-level meetings to coordinate the positions of the various countries regarding the management of the humanitarian refugee crisis, but so far it has not been possible to reach a binding agreement with commitments. The quotas of people that each country is responsible for hosting have not been agreed upon, an issue that must be resolved peremptorily.

2. HUMANITARIAN REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA.

At the Summit of April 23, 2015, it was decided, at the proposal of the President of the European Commission, Juncker, to triple the funds that the EU allocates to Operation Triton, integrated into Frontex. Triton's financing goes from 3 to 9 million euros per month³, but the rescue function is not included among its powers. The so-called Framework Strategy is also established, which consists of redistributing 40,000 asylum seekers who are currently in Italy (24,000) and in Greece (14,000), as well as resettling another 20,000 people located in Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. A quota system for the distribution is agreed based on four scales: 40% depending on the country's population, 40% of GDP, 10% of the unemployment rate and another 10% depending on the previous efforts made by the country in the reception of refugees. It is also agreed to act

³ About all this, see: AGENCIA EFE 2015.

against the mafias and other security issues such as the collection of fingerprints from people who request refuge.

After the quota system for the distribution of refugees was agreed at the Summit, disagreements occurred again due to the proportion of people to be welcomed between the different countries that make up the EU and the agreement was broken, as had happened previously. In the midst of this new crisis in the agreements, the European Commission recognizes the emergency situation in Hungary, which joins Italy and Greece and requests the reception of 120,000 people, mostly Syrians. On September 9, 2015, the Commission makes a proposal to distribute to the 120,000 new refugees⁴. In it, the countries with the highest number of people to host are Germany (31,443), France (24,031) and Spain (14,931)⁵. However, this is by no means the realization of a definitive agreement in the distribution.

In this context, in December 2015 the Valletta Summit on Immigration was held in Malta⁶. At this Summit, the European and African Heads of Government meet with the aim of strengthening cooperation on migration. It approves the *European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability, which will make it possible to tackle the root causes of irregular migration and displacement of people in Africa*. The Fund contains 1,800 million euros contributed by the European Development Fund (EDF) and to that is added the individual contributions of the member countries, which add up to around 80 million more. This fund represents an additional contribution to the development aid of the European Union and the Member States for Africa, corresponding to 20,000 million euros per year. Its objective is to contribute to stability and sustainable economic growth.

⁴ Criteria remain population, GDP, unemployment rate, and past host efforts. About this, see: AMADE, Emilio 2015.

⁵ *IBIDEM*.

⁶ EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2015.

The member countries of the Summit issued a political declaration⁷ and an action plan with commitments to address the root causes of irregular immigration and forced displacement, enhance cooperation, strengthen the protection of migrants and asylum seekers, prevent and combat the irregular migration and collaborate in matters of return, readmission and reintegration.

Many social agents publicly expressed their criticism of the Valletta Summit for not having provided solutions or substantial commitments in the management of migration. Amnesty International states that the agreements are essentially about increasing border control and facilitating return procedures, yet they do not add anything new in terms of creating safe routes and guaranteeing the rights of migrants. He states that the meeting is a mere exchange from which the sending countries reduce migratory flows, receiving economic and material aid from the EU in return.

In the following months, the humanitarian emergency situation of refugees continues to worsen without a solution being reached. The Syrian war continues to escalate and the number of people trying to reach Europe to find safety increases. Gracia, Italy and Hungary are overwhelmed by the number of people arriving in their territory and in Europe no real agreement is reached for their redistribution. Throughout all this time, the EU and Turkey maintain a continuous and intense negotiation for the Turks to close the migration routes to Europe through their territory. Finally, on March 18, 2016, the EU-Turkey Pact⁸ is signed according to which the Turks undertake to accept all immigrants in an irregular situation who have fled to Greece from their territory and who are returned, whether they are

⁷ EUROPEAN COUNCIL 2015 (1).

⁸ About the EU-Turkey Pact, see the EU-Turkey Declaration: EUROPEAN COUNCIL 2016 (2). In this regard, reference should also be made to the European Council Conclusions of March 17 and 18, 2016: EUROPEAN COUNCIL 2016 (1).

immigrants by economic causes or asylum seekers⁹. The Pact seeks to reduce migratory pressure towards the EU and encourage migrants to desist from irregular entry. However, they are not offered an alternative to their dramatic situation, and the procedures to request refuge are not facilitated. They are not even offered the possibility of applying for asylum in their country of origin.

The reality is that the Pact gives freedom to expel very quickly all those people who deem it appropriate. The agreement also implies that for each person of Syrian origin in an irregular situation returned to Europe, it must legally admit another, who would be sent from a Turkish camp. However, it puts a maximum of 72,000, that is, a substantially lower number of people of Turkish origin who try to flee to Greece annually. In 2015 alone, more than 885,000 people entered Greece irregularly, of which 876,000 came from Turkey¹⁰. With these data, it is easily perceptible that the figure is clearly insufficient, as has been criticized by NGOs, associations and organizations sensitive to human rights.

The agreement includes that Turkey receives 3,000 million euros in aid to cooperation and development projects and the commitment to contribute another 3,000 million euros for future projects. The EU is also committed to expediting visas for Turks traveling to Europe and to resuming negotiations for their future membership of the EU. The latter, however, seems increasingly uncertain given the climate of instability and authoritarianism that currently exists in Turkey.

The EU-Turkey Pact has been harshly criticized by different social agents, NGOs and international organizations. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued a statement expressing

⁹ About the process of negotiation and formulation of the EU-Turkey Pact and its implications are very interesting: SUANZES, Pablo R. 2016 (3); SUANZES, Pablo R. 2016 (2); SUANZES, Pablo R. 2016 (1); AGENCIES 2016; GALARRAGA, Naiara 2016; CRUZ, Marisa 2016.

¹⁰ SUANZES, Pablo R. 2016 (1). *OP. CIT.*

serious concern about the conditions of refugees in Greece. In it, it states that the Pact is being carried out without the adequate means, that Greece does not have the necessary means to respond to asylum requests or to guarantee optimal living conditions for asylum seekers while their requests are studied. It clarifies that UNHCR is in no way part of the Pact and that it will not intervene in any action of detention or return, but will only dedicate itself to helping in the work of assistance and help in the reception of people.

Most of the NGOs that have been working in Greece are against the Pact and strongly protest¹¹. There are many examples. Doctors Without Borders withdrew from Idomeni due to insecurity and decided to terminate its activity in the Moria refugee camp in Lesbos, as, they argue, had gone from being a reception center to becoming a de facto expulsion center¹². The International Rescue Committee suspends several rescue and assistance programs after the Pact. Save the Children refuses to participate in the support maneuvers in Greece. Amnesty International denounces that the agreement is *a historic blow against human rights*¹³.

On May 4, 2016, the Spanish Commission for Refugee Aid (CEAR)¹⁴ denounces the violation of refugee rights to the European Commission, the Council of Europe and the European Ombudsman with the support of almost 300 organizations and more of 11,000 signatories. Shortly after, on May 11, it publishes a series of conditions to guarantee the rights and guarantees of asylum seekers¹⁵.

¹¹About this, see: EURONEWS, “Las ONG se retiran en protesta por el acuerdo sobre los refugiados entre la UE y Turquía”, *Euronews*, March 24, 2016.

<http://es.euronews.com/2016/03/24/que-pasara-ahora-tras-el-acuerdo-sobre-refugiados-entre-la-ue-y-turquia/>. [09-1-2021].

¹² *IBIDEM*.

¹³ *IBIDEM*.


¹⁴ COMISIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE AYUDA AL REFUGIADO 2016 (1).

¹⁵ COMISIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE AYUDA AL REFUGIADO 2016 (2).

3. PUBLIC INTEGRATION POLICIES.

In European Union, since the beginning of the 21st century, the important multi-annual programs of Tampere (1999-2004), The Hague (2005-2009) and Stockholm (2010-2014) were launched. However, they have not continued as such. This is not good news as these programs have made significant progress. The main measures that we find in terms of integration, after this date, no longer enjoy the focus and comprehensive scope of the previous multi-year programs. In 2015, we have the European Agenda on Migration (2015). This focuses on: reducing incentives for irregular migration; managing borders save lives and protect external borders; develop a stronger common asylum policy; and establish a new legal migration policy by modernizing and reviewing the blue card system, determining new priorities in terms of integration policies, and optimizing the benefits that migration policy provides to affected people and countries of origin source.

In the same sense, is the Action Plan for Integration (2016). In the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework, Member States allocated EUR 765 million to integration in their national programs financed by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). In the previous financial framework 2007-2013, EUR 825 million was spent under the European Integration Fund.



Funds for Integration EU.

4. GLOBAL COMPACT FOR MIGRATION.

On September 19, 2016, the UN Summit on Migrants and Refugees is held at the UN General Assembly in New York to establish a global migration system that establishes quotas, clear protocols of action and a balanced distribution of responsibilities in the face of humanitarian crises of refugees like the one we are living in today. The then Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, stated at the summit that: *The human rights of all refugees and migrants must be placed at the heart of our commitments.*

After long and tense negotiations, the outcome of the Summit was a formal, non-binding Declaration with measures aimed at managing the humanitarian refugee crisis more efficiently. Thus, the possible Pact is postponed until 2018.

The reactions to the lack of a solid and decisive agreement are notorious. Immigrant associations, NGOs and multiple organizations publicly show their disappointment and urge world leaders to take action. Amnesty International Secretary General, Salil Shetty, makes an angry critique, lamenting that the Summit did not conclude on the long-awaited global refugee agreement. In this sense, he says that: *Rich countries cannot*

*just promise money and leave. The 360,000 resettlement places offered around the world must be seen in the context of the more than 20 million refugees around the world*¹⁶.

In the same direction, the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth, calls the summit a *missed opportunity*¹⁷. Oxfam International Executive Director, Winnie Byanyima, also urges host countries to get more involved: *We need to see countries welcoming more refugees and offering them jobs and education*¹⁸. In this sense, it affects the prevalence of the international agreements signed in the face of other internal key conditions: *Many governments fear that they will see this issue influencing their political agendas, but they must comply with their obligations under international law and show empathy towards the most vulnerable*¹⁹.

A year later, on January 27, 2017, Trump proclaims an Executive Order suspending the granting of visas for 90 days to people from seven countries with a Muslim majority: Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Iran. The reason given is National Security, considering that the people of these countries could have a terrorist history. The Order also prohibits the entry of Syrian refugees indefinitely and from the rest of the world for 120 days.

Judge Ann M. Donnelly, of the Federal District Court of Brooklyn (New York), was the first to not accept the veto and after her numerous trial judges who paralyzed the veto. Even the Attorney General of the State, Sally Yates, ordered the lawyers of the Department of Justice not to support the veto questioning its legality, which caused his dismissal. Numerous prosecutors across the country claimed that the immigration ban was: *Unconstitutional, anti-American, and illegal*.

¹⁶ INTERNATIONAL AMNESTY 2016.

¹⁷ POZZI, Sandro and AYUSO, Sandra 2016.

¹⁸ *IBIDEM*.

¹⁹ *IBIDEM*.

The already Secretary General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, spoke out against the migratory veto, a few days after it was proclaimed: *Any form of discrimination related to religion, ethnicity or nationality is contrary to the fundamental principles and values of our societies.* Guterres, who before being Secretary General of the United Nations headed the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), advocates the resettlement policy, in which the United States has always played an important role and stated that: *It is not the best or most effective way to protect the US or any other country from terrorism, remembering that: refugees live in a dramatic situation and have no other option but to seek protection.*

Finally, in December 2018, the United Nations General Assembly approved the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), despite notable absences, such as the US, and finally Brazil. Following the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. It is a long-awaited agreement, which, however, has the weakness of not being binding. Everyone was waiting for an agreement in which the states would commit to respecting measures for the protection of people and guidelines for coordination and joint responsibility to respond to the current humanitarian refugee crisis. However, the result has been a non-binding, but a voluntary agreement. On this question, there are different positions. Ours is that it is always better to have an agreement than to have nothing, therefore, the Pact is in itself an important progress. But at the same time, it is disappointing that it was not given all the strength it would need to solve the important problem that exists.

The Compact focuses on delivering a comprehensive response and is based on four key objectives: relieving pressure on countries hosting refugees; improve the self-reliance of refugees; expand refugee access to solutions in third countries; and supporting conditions in countries of origin so that refugees return in safety and dignity.

5. THE MIGRATORY ISSUE IN CIVIL SOCIETY.

The public reaction to the dramatic situation we are experiencing in this humanitarian refugee crisis has been ambivalent. At the same time that anti-immigration and even extremist platforms have proliferated in Europe, with significant support from a sector of society, there has also been a citizen reaction of solidarity, concern for the human rights of refugees and creation of support networks. There are examples of this in many European countries.

In Germany, hundreds of independent associations, made up of volunteers with very heterogeneous socio-economic profiles, coordinate reception and aid actions for refugees. Their actions range from the most urgent and immediate assistance to help in longer-term issues. They have a high degree of organization and information in real time. Examples are “wie-kann-ich-helfen.info” (support platform) or “#welcome challenge helfer aktivieren helfer” (welcome the challenge: volunteers activate volunteers). Another example is the Goethe University's Academic Experience Worldwide project, which offers a wide variety of resources such as help guides, a medical network of volunteer medical students, volunteer teachers, welcome classes, integration projects and university meetings.

In Italy, on September 11, 2015, thousands of people from more than 60 cities took to the streets in the “March of barefoot women and men”²⁰ to protest the situation of refugees and ask the Government for solidarity, welcome, improvement of its conditions and effective solutions. On May 20, 2017, the “Youth without walls” march took place in Milan, in which more than 100,000 people participated. The march was led by 200 refugees.


In Spain, there have been numerous local organizations and associations. There has also been an increase in donations and collaboration with associations and NGOs. Multiple forums have called for greater

²⁰About the march and its organization, see: <http://donneuominiscalzi.blogspot.com.es/p/lista-generale.html> [18-3-2017].

involvement and compliance with international commitments on asylum: UNHCR, CEAR, Change.org, etc. Host citizen networks have also played an important role, usually in collaboration with associations and institutions. The networks of refuge cities are also a sample of collaboration between city councils and citizens to promote reception. This collaboration has materialized, among other things, in the transfer of public facilities and resources, health care personnel, financial items. There are examples of this in Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, A Coruña, Galicia, Zaragoza, Málaga, Pamplona, etc.

The migratory veto imposed by Donald Trump upon his arrival in the US Government, while receiving numerous support, also provoked significant criticism, appeals of unconstitutionality and mobilizations. There were massive protests at airports and in the main large cities of the country.

However, in addition to having a proactive, tolerant or favorable discourse regarding immigration within society, there is also a reactive, contrary or suspicious discourse, which has significant support. Some data clearly show us. For example, there is a study carried out by IPSOS, echoed by the newspaper *El País*, in which people from various countries of the European Union are asked what they think is the proportion of people of Muslim origin who live in their country. The answers are very revealing. In all the countries consulted, there is a perception well above the real amount. The difference between the real data and the perception of the people is very disproportionate. In France, the perception is 32%, while they actually represent 7.5%, that is, about five times more than reality. In Italy, it is perceived that they represent 20%, while they are actually at 4%, that is, again five times more. In Germany, the general opinion is that they are 21%, but they are actually 5%, which is more than 4 times more. In Spain, they are at 14%, when they are actually at 2.5%, that is, more than 5 times more. And so we could continue with the rest of the countries of the European Union.




Source: El País-IPSOS (2017)²¹

Very worrying is the study carried out by the Royal Chatham House. In it, citizens of various European Union countries are asked if they would agree to impose an immigration veto in their respective states like the one imposed by Donald Trump in the United States. This migratory veto consisted of the prohibition of entry to the country for people from seven countries with a Muslim majority. It was the subject of various unconstitutionality appeals and caused astonishment within the international community, with the Secretary General of the United Nations himself, the Portuguese Antonio Guterres, having ruled against this measure. Well, the result of the consultation indicates that the vast majority of people who were asked agreed with a similar ban being carried out in their respective countries. In some countries the number of people who

²¹ GALÁN, Javier y ABAD, José Manuel 2017.

were in favor was actually very large. In the total of people consulted, the average of the different countries in which the consultation was carried out, 55% affirmed to be in favor, 25% did not have a clear and defined position and only 20% were against. If we analyze the responses by country, the data are similar. In Belgium they are 65% in favor, 20% undefined and 15% against. In Germany, 51.5% were in favor, 29% indefinite and 19.5% against. In the case of Greece, 59% were in favor, 21% were unclear and 20% were against. In Spain, 41% were in favor of the measure, 28% did not know clearly and 31% were against. In France, the percentage of people who were in favor rose to 61%, 21% were neither in favor nor against and 18% defined themselves against the migratory veto. In Italy, 50% were in favor, 28% were unclear and 22% were against. In Austria, 65% were in favor, 17% did not define themselves in one position or the other and 18% were against. In the UK, 48% were in favor, 30% neither in favor nor against and 22% against. In Hungary, 64% were in favor, 24% were neither in favor nor against, and only 12% were against. In the case of Poland, it is very striking, since the vast majority, 71%, were in favor, 20% did not agree or disagree, and only 9% were against such a measure.



Source: El País-Chatham House (2017)²²

Another unquestionable data that points in the same direction are the results of the last elections to the European Parliament. The European People's Party (EPP), located in the moderate center right, was the winner with 179 seats and 23.89% of the votes. In second place were the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), located in the moderate center-left, with 153 seats and 20.37% of the votes. Third place went to the Democrats and Liberals (ADLE & R), who represent the European neoliberals, with 106 seats and 14.11% of the vote. So far, nothing is strange with respect to other elections. Any of the three parties represents options consistent with the democratic model of rights and freedoms that constitute our modern democracies. What is alarming is in three other parties that are in really extreme positions, very polarized, coincide in their openly reactive discourse against

²² CHATHAM HOUSE 2017.

immigration, sometimes even surpassing the border of racism and xenophobia, and, although they defend opposing approaches and are far apart. among themselves, they have obtained a not marginal representativeness. These are the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), ultra-conservative, with 64 seats and 8.52% of the votes; the Europe of Nations and Freedoms (ENL), of an anti-European character, with 58 seats and 7.72% of the votes; and Europe, Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), a eurosceptic and populist party, which won 54 seats and 7.19% of the votes. It is true that separately they lack the strength of the major parties and their internal differences make an alliance complicated, however, if we add the representativeness obtained by the three, the result would be 176 seats and 23.42% of the votes. In other words, it would be very close to the support received by the party that won the elections, the European People's Party (EPP).

6. CONCLUSIONS.

The humanitarian refugee crisis that we have been experiencing in recent years has highlighted the need to create a global migration management system. So far, all attempts to undertake such an undertaking have been unsuccessful. The states are reluctant to give up part of their sovereignty in a matter as delicate as the management of foreigners, the interests of the countries in this field are very different, the social perception of the phenomenon is also very diverse.

This has been clearly seen in the European Union with the humanitarian crisis of refugees that we are experiencing, especially worse since 2015 and which continues without a solution, which is unacceptable. More and more thousands of people are trying to flee the war and violence caused by armed conflicts in North Africa.

On the global scale, the United Nations has tried unsuccessfully to create a tool for coordination and joint responsibility in the distribution of migratory quotas for asylum seekers, which would be mandatory in the countries that make up international society and serve to efficiently manage

and in accordance with international law, both this humanitarian crisis and those that may occur in the future. Finally, this attempt has resulted in a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, which is not binding, that is, the signatory countries have not acquired the firm commitment to comply with it, beyond voluntarism. There are numerous reasons for this lack of understanding. But as long as we do not achieve a global response, there will be no solution to an emergency whose number of victims is growing exponentially.

The polarization of politics at the European and global level that we are witnessing in recent years and the policies carried out on immigration do not allow us to be very optimistic. The citizen reaction is ambivalent. On the one hand, there has been a citizen reaction of solidarity and defense of the rights of refugees. This reaction has served to vindicate human rights, incite governments to take more efficient measures and perceive how it is possible to manage migration in a manner consistent with international treaties and people's rights. But, on the other hand, public opinion is increasingly fragmented and there is a reactive, suspicious or even openly opposed to immigration and cultural diversity discourse that has great social support, as has been shown in this research.

Ultimately, if we intend to find elements of agreement, coordinate and create solid and lasting solutions to current problems, the way is not to resort to exclusive nationalisms, private interests or belligerent positions. A humanistic approach is required that appeals to multilateralism, democratic values and Human Rights as a guarantee of the dignity and well-being of people. And in this paradigm, the migration issue currently has dimensions of such caliber that the resolution of the humanitarian crisis of refugees must be undertaken quickly, in accordance with international law and with the commitment of all the countries involved. The life and well-being of millions of people and the health of the entire international human rights protection system depend on this, which has provided us with the longest period of guarantees, peace and prosperity in the history of humanity.

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